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Climate change, financial stability and monetary policy 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Climate change is likely to have severe effects on the stability of the financial system (see, for 
instance, Aglietta and Espagne, 2016; Batten et al., 2016; Scott et al., 2017). Two broad climate-
related financial risks have been identified: (a) the transition risks that have to do with the re-
valuation of carbon-intensive assets as a result of shocks related to the transition to a low-carbon 
economy; and (b) the physical risks that are linked to the economic damages of climate-related 
events. So far, most studies have concentrated on the implications of transition risks (see e.g. 
Carbon Tracker Initiative, 2011; Johnson, 2012; Battiston et al., 2017; Stolbova et al., 2018; Trinks 
et al., 2018). Less attention has been paid to the detailed analysis of physical risks, which have only 
partially been explored in macro models by Dietz et al. (2016), Dafermos et al. (2017) and Bovari 
et al. (2018). The investigation of the physical risks is particularly important: it would help us 
understand how the financial system could be impaired if the transition to a low-carbon economy 
is very slow in the next decades and, consequently, severe global warming is not ultimately 
avoided. It would also allow us to understand which policies might be more effective in reducing 
the financial instability that might stem from climate damages.  
 
In this paper, we develop an ecological macroeconomic model that sheds light on the physical 
effects of climate change on financial stability. This is called the DEFINE (Dynamic Ecosystem-
FINance-Economy) model, which builds on the stock-flow-fund model of Dafermos et al. (2017). 
The latter relies on a novel synthesis of the stock-flow consistent (SFC) approach of Godley and 
Lavoie (2007) with the flow-fund model of Georgescu-Roegen (1971, ch. 9; 1979; 1984).1 The 
model is calibrated and estimated using global data and simulations are presented, which illustrate 
the effects of climate change on the financial system. We pay attention to the following key 
channels. First, the increase in temperature and the economic catastrophes caused by climate 
change could reduce the profitability of firms and could deteriorate their financial position. 
Accordingly, debt defaults could arise, which would lead to systemic bank losses. Second, lower 
firm profitability combined with global warming-related damages can affect the confidence of 
                                                 
1 See the model’s website: www.define-model.org. 
2 
 
investors, inducing a rise in liquidity preference and a fire sale of the financial instruments issued 
by the corporate sector.  
 
Dietz et al. (2016) have recently investigated quantitatively the physical impact of climate change 
on the financial system. They use a standard integrated assessment model (IAM) and the climate 
value at risk (VAR) framework. Assuming that climate change can reduce the dividend payments 
of firms and, hence, the price of financial assets, they provide various estimates about the climate-
induced loss in the value of financial assets. Our study moves beyond their analysis in three 
different ways. First, by relying on an SFC approach, we portray explicitly the balance sheets and 
the financial flows in the financial sector. This allows us to model the climate-induced fragility 
that can be caused in the financial structures of firms and banks, a feature which is absent in Dietz 
et al. (2016). Second, we utilise a multiple financial asset portfolio choice framework, which 
permits an explicit analysis of the climate-induced effects on the demand of financial assets in a 
world of fundamental uncertainty. This allows us to capture the implications of a fire sale of 
certain financial assets. These implications are not explicitly considered in the model of Dietz et 
al. (2016) where climate damages do not have diversified effects on different financial assets. 
Third, the financial system in our model has a non-neutral impact on economic activity: credit 
availability and the price of financial assets affect economic growth and employment. Accordingly, 
the interactions between economic performance and financial (in)stability are explicitly taken into 
account. This is crucial since the feedback economic effects of bank losses and asset price 
deflation can exacerbate climate-induced financial instability (see Batten et al., 2016). On the 
contrary, Dietz et al. (2016) utilise a neoclassical growth framework where long-run growth is 
independent of the financial structure of firms and banks. This leaves little room for the analysis 
of the macroeconomic implications of climate-induced financial problems.  
 
Our methodological approach shares more similarities with Bovari et al. (2018) who have 
investigated how climate change can affect the indebtedness of firms, using an SFC model. 
However, their model abstracts from asset prices and assumes a passive banking system in which 
there is no explicit credit rationing and no effect of endogenous defaults on bank capital. This 
implies that the feedback effects of climate-inducing financial instability on the macroeconomy 
cannot be explicitly explored, as is the case in the current model.  
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Our simulation results illustrate that in a business as usual scenario climate change is likely to have 
important adverse effects on the default of firms, the leverage of banks and the price of financial 
assets. These effects become more severe after global warming passes the 2.5oC threshold. 
Importantly, climate-induced financial instability reinforces the adverse effects of climate change 
on economic activity. 
 
An additional contribution of this paper is that it examines how monetary policy could reduce the 
risks imposed on the financial system by climate change. Drawing on the recent discussions about 
the potential use of monetary policy in tackling climate change (see e.g. Murphy and Hines, 2010; 
Werner, 2012; Rozenberg et al., 2013; Anderson, 2015; Barkawi and Monnin, 2015; Campiglio, 
2016; Matikainen et al., 2017; Volz, 2017; Monasterolo and Raberto, 2018), we examine the extent 
to which a global green quantitative easing (QE) programme could ameliorate the financial 
distress caused by climate change. This programme involves the purchase of green corporate 
bonds.  
 
The paper’s outline is as follows. Section 2 presents the structure of the model and the key 
equations that capture the links between climate change, financial stability and monetary policy. 
Section 3 describes the calibration, estimation and validation of the model. Section 4 analyses our 
simulations about the effects of climate change on the financial system. Section 5 focuses on the 
impact of a green QE programme. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. The model 
 
The DEFINE model (version 1.0) consists of two big blocks: (i) the ‘ecosystem’ block that 
encapsulates the carbon cycle, the interaction between temperature and carbon, the flows/stocks 
of energy and matter and the evolution of ecological efficiency indicators; (ii) the ‘macroeconomy 
and financial system’ block that includes the financial transactions, the balance sheet structure and 
the behaviour of households, firms, banks, central banks and the government sector. The 
technical description of the model and the information about the data used for its calibration and 
estimation can be found in Appendix A. 
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It is assumed that there is one type of material good that can be used for durable consumption 
and (conventional and green) investment purposes. Four matter/energy transformation processes 
are necessary for the production of this good and all of them require capital and labour. First, 
matter (non-metallic minerals and metal ores) has to be extracted from the ground and has to be 
transformed into a form that can be used as an input in the production. Second, useful energy has 
to be generated based on non-renewable sources (e.g. oil, gas and coal) or renewable sources (e.g. 
sun, wind). Third, recycling has to take place. Every year a part of the capital stock and the 
durable consumption goods that have been accumulated in the socio-economic system are 
demolished/discarded; the material content of these accumulated capital goods and durable 
consumption goods is called socio-economic stock.2 A proportion of this demolished/discarded 
socio-economic stock is recycled and is used as an inflow in the production of the final good. 
This means that not all of the matter that is necessary for the production of the good has to be 
extracted from the ground. Fourth, the final good needs to be produced using material and energy 
inflows from the other processes.  
 
Crucially, all these four processes, in combination with the functioning of the whole socio-
economic system, generate by-products. In particular, industrial CO2 emissions are produced as a 
result of the combustion of fossil fuels. Energy is dissipated in all transformation processes; this 
energy cannot be used again. In addition, the demolished/discarded socio-economic stock that is 
not recycled becomes waste. Part of this waste is hazardous and can have adverse effects on the 
health of the population.   
 
Since the model focuses on the aggregate effects of production, all the above-mentioned 
processes have been consolidated and are presented as part of the total production process. An 
unconsolidated formulation of the production process would make the model and its calibration 
much more complicated without changing the substance of the analysis that we pursue here. 
However, such an unconsolidated version would be useful for the analysis of intra-firm dynamics 
and could be the subject of future extensions of the model. 
 
                                                 
2 This is a term used in material flow analysis (see e.g. Krausmann et al., 2015). In general, socio-economic stock also 
includes animal livestock and humans. However, these stocks (whose mass remains relatively stable over time) are not 
included in our analysis. As will be explained below, socio-economic stock is measured in Gigatonnes. 
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Although capital, labour, energy and matter are all necessary in the transformation processes, 
these resources do not directly determine the level of production as long as they are not scarce: in 
the absence of scarcity, the level of production is demand-determined, in line with the post-
Keynesian tradition. However, if any of these resources is not sufficient to satisfy the demand, 
production is directly affected by resource scarcity. In particular, we assume that, under supply-
side constraints, consumption and investment demand might decline. Moreover, although all 
these resources are necessary for the production of goods based on our Leontief-type production 
function (i.e. there is imperfect substitutability), their relative use changes because of technological 
progress.  
 
The way that carbon emissions affect climate change follows closely Nordhaus and Sztorc (2013). 
In particular, CO2 emissions lead to an increase in atmospheric CO2 concentration. The evolution 
of CO2 concentration is affected by the carbon cycle that captures the exchange of carbon 
between the atmosphere and the upper ocean/biosphere and between the upper ocean/biosphere 
and the lower ocean. The accumulation of atmospheric CO2 and other greenhouse gases increases 
radiative forcing. This increase places upward pressures on atmospheric temperature. 
 
A crucial distinction is made between green capital and conventional capital. Compared to 
conventional capital, green capital is characterised by lower energy intensity, lower material 
intensity and higher recycling rate. Moreover, green capital produces energy using renewable 
sources, while conventional capital produces energy using the non-renewable sources. Hence, the 
use of green capital is conducive to a low-carbon economy.3 As the proportion of green capital to 
conventional capital increases, the goods consumed by households are produced in a more 
environmentally friendly way. However, we do not make a distinction between conventional and 
green consumption goods. This means that households’ environmental preferences do not have a 
direct impact on the decisions of firms about green and conventional investment.   
 
                                                 
3 A more realistic formulation would be to assume different ‘shades of green’ depending on the number of ‘green’ 
properties that each capital has. In that case, the ‘greenest’ capital would be that capital that can generate renewable 
energy and is endowed by lower energy intensity, lower material intensity and higher recycling rate compared to 
conventional capital. On the other hand, the least ‘green’ capital would be the capital that has only one of these 
properties. However, such a formulation would complicate the model significantly since it would require the 
distinction between many types of green investment and would make the calibration of the model a much more 
challenging exercise.    
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Firms invest in conventional and green capital by using retained profits, loans and bonds. 
Commercial banks accumulate capital and distribute part of their profits to households. They 
impose credit rationing on firm loans. This means that they play an active role in the 
determination of output and the accumulation of green capital. Households receive labour 
income, buy durable consumption goods and accumulate wealth in the form of deposits, 
corporate bonds and government securities (there are no household loans). Corporate bonds can 
be either green or conventional. When the demand for green bonds increases, the price of these 
bonds tends to go up, leading to a lower cost of borrowing for green projects. 
 
Therefore, we overall have that a higher willingness of banks to provide credit for green projects 
and a higher demand for green bonds by households boosts innovative green investment. At the 
same time, higher green investment can reduce the physical risks for the financial system, as will 
be explained in detail below. This implies that our model allows us to investigate the finance-
green innovation nexus. However, there are various aspects of the finance-green innovation nexus 
that are not analysed in this paper. In particular, the financing of green investment can lead to 
fundamental changes in the way that the production system uses energy and matter, causing a 
shift to a new techno-economic paradigm. As has been emphasised in the neo-
Schumpeterian/evolutionary literature (see e.g. Perez, 2009, 2010), a shift to a new techno-
economic paradigm might entail transition risks, can cause financial booms and busts and can lead 
to fundamental socio-economic changes. The detailed investigation of these aspects of the 
transition to a more ecologically efficient economy can be the subject of future applications and 
extensions of the model.4 
 
Central banks play a key role in our model. They determine the base interest rate, provide liquidity 
to the commercial banks and purchase government securities and corporate bonds. When they 
buy green corporate bonds as part of a green QE programme, they place downward pressures on 
the green bond yields, and this has positive effects on the cost of borrowing for green projects. 
Governments collect taxes, decide about the level of government expenditures and can 
implement bailout programmes if there are financial problems in the banking sector.  
 
                                                 
4 For an SFC model that has analysed the interlinkages between technological change, finance and the real economy, 
drawing on the literature on techno-economic paradigms, see Caiani et al. (2014).  
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Inflation has been assumed away and, for simplicity, the price of goods is equal to unity. We use 
US dollar ($) as a reference currency. The model has an annual time step.  
 
The skeleton of the model is captured by four matrices. The first matrix is the physical flow 
matrix (Table 1), which portrays the inflows and the outflows of matter and energy that take place 
as a result of the production process. The First Law of Thermodynamics implies that energy and 
matter cannot be created or destroyed. This is reflected in the material and energy balance. The 
second matrix is the physical stock-flow matrix (Table 2), which presents the dynamic change in 
material and non-renewable energy reserves, the atmospheric CO2 concentration, the socio-
economic stock and the stock of hazardous waste. The first row of the matrix shows the stocks of 
the previous year. The last row presents the stocks at the end of the current year. Additions to 
stocks are denoted by a plus sign. Reductions of stocks are denoted by a minus sign. The third 
matrix is the transactions flow matrix (Table 3), which shows the transactions that take place 
between the various sectors of the economy. Inflows are denoted by a plus sign and outflows are 
denoted by a minus sign. The last matrix is the balance sheet matrix (Table 4) which includes the 
assets and the liabilities of the sectors. We use a plus sign for assets and a minus sign for liabilities. 
 
Table 1: Physical flow matrix  
Material 
balance
Energy 
balance
Inputs
Extracted matter +M
Renewable energy +ER
Non-renewable energy +CEN +EN
Oxygen used for fossil fuel combustion +O2
Outputs
Industrial CO2 emissions -EMIS IN
Waste -W
Dissipated energy -ED
Change in socio-economic stock -ΔSES
Total 0 0  
Note: The table refers to annual global flows. Matter is measured in Gt and energy is measured in EJ. A detailed description of the 
symbols can be found in Appendix A. 
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Table 2: Physical stock-flow matrix 
Material 
reserves
Non-renewable 
energy reserves
Atmospheric CO2
 concentration
Socio-economic 
stock
Hazardous
waste
Opening stock REV M-1 REV E-1 CO2 AT-1 SES -1 HWS -1
Additions to stock
   Resources converted into reserves +CON M +CON E
   CO2 emissions +EMIS
   Production of material goods +MY
   Non-recycled hazardous waste +hazW
Reductions of stock
   Extraction/use of matter or energy -M -EN
   Net transfer of CO2 to oceans/biosphere
   Demolished/disposed socio-economic stock -DEM
Closing stock REV M REV E CO2 AT SES HWS
  121111 221   UPAT COCO 
 
Note: The table refers to annual global stocks and flows. Matter is measured in Gt and energy is measured in EJ. A detailed description of the symbols 
can be found in Appendix A. 
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Table 3: Transactions flow matrix 
Government sector Total
Current Capital Current Capital Current Capital Current Capital
Consumption -C +C 0
Government expenditures +G -G 0
Conventional investment +I C -I C 0
Green investment +I G -I G 0
Household disposable income net of depreciation -Y HD +Y HD 0
Wages +wN -wN 0
Taxes -T H -T F +T 0
Firms' profits +DP -TP +RP 0
Commercial banks' profits +BP D -BP +BP U 0
Interest on deposits +int D D -1  -int D D -1 0
Depreciation of green capital -δK G-1 +δK G-1 0
Depreciation of conventional capital -δK C-1 +δK C-1 0
Interest on conventional loans -int CL C-1 +int C L C-1 0
Interest on green loans -int GL G-1 +int GL G-1 0
Interest on conventional bonds +coupon Cb CH-1 -coupon C b C-1 +coupon Cb CCB-1 0
Interest on green bonds +coupon Gb GH-1 -coupon Gb G-1 +coupon Gb GCB-1 0
Interest on government securities +int S SEC H-1 +int S SEC B-1 -int S SEC -1 +int S SEC CB-1 0
Interest on advances -int AA -1 +int AA -1 0
Depreciation of durable consumption goods -ξDC -1 +ξDC -1 0
Central bank's profits +CBP -CBP 0
Bailout of banks +BAILOUT -BAILOUT 0
Δdeposits -ΔD +ΔD 0
Δconventional loans +ΔL C -ΔL C 0
Δgreen loans +ΔLG -ΔLG 0
Δconventional bonds -p̅CΔbCH +p̅CΔbC -p̅CΔbCCB 0
Δgreen bonds -p̅GΔbGH +p̅GΔbG -p̅GΔbGCB 0
Δgovernment securities -ΔSECH -ΔSEC B +ΔSEC -ΔSEC CB 0
Δadvances +ΔA -ΔA 0
Δhigh-powered money -ΔHPM +ΔHPM 0
Defaulted loans +DL -DL 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Firms Commercial banks Central banksHouseholds
 
Note: The table refers to annual global flows in trillion US$. A detailed description of the symbols can be found in Appendix A. 
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Table 4: Balance sheet matrix 
Households Firms Commercial 
banks
Government 
sector
Central 
banks
Total
Conventional capital +K C +K C
Green capital +K G +K G
Durable consumption goods +DC +DC
Deposits +D -D 0
Conventional loans -L C +L C 0
Green loans -L G +L G 0
Conventional bonds +p Cb CH -p C b C +p Cb CCB 0
Green bonds +p Gb GH -p Gb G +p Gb GCB 0
Government securities +SEC H +SEC B -SEC +SEC CB 0
High-powered money +HPM -HPM 0
Advances -A +A 0
Total (net worth) +V H +V F +K B -SEC +V CB +K C +K G +DC  
Note: The table refers to annual global stocks in trillion US$. A detailed description of the symbols can be found in Appendix A. 
 
The model extends the model developed by Dafermos et al. (2017) by including a bond market, 
central banking, the government sector, household portfolio choice and an endogenous rate of 
default for firms. In what follows we present the equations of the model that are more relevant 
for the interactions between climate change, financial stability and monetary policy. A detailed 
description of the equations of the model can be found in Appendix A. 
 
2.1. Green capital, energy intensity and renewable energy 
 
Green capital allows firms to produce the same output with less energy. This is captured by the 
following logistic function: 
 
 6 1 1
51
G C
max min
max
K K
e

 
 
  


 

 (1) 
 
where   is energy intensity, 5  and 6  are positive parameters and 
max  and min  are, 
respectively, the maximum and the minimum potential values of energy intensity. As the ratio of 
green capital ( GK ) to conventional capital ( CK ) increases, energy intensity goes down. The use of 
the logistic function implies that the installation of green capital (relative to conventional capital) 
initially generates a slow improvement in energy intensity. However, as installation expands 
further, the improvement reaches a take-off point after which energy intensity improves much 
more rapidly, due to the learning obtained from installation experience and the overall expansion 
11 
 
of green capital infrastructure that has positive network effects. Finally, as energy intensity 
approaches its potential minimum, improvement starts to slow. 
 
A similar logistic function is used for the effects of green capital accumulation on the share of 
renewable energy in total energy produced ( ): 
 
 8 1 1
7
1
1 G C
K K
e


  



 (2) 
 
where 7  and 8  are positive parameters. By definition, the maximum potential value of   is 1. 
Note that in Dafermos et al. (2017) the formulation of the links between green capital and 
ecological efficiency indicators is quite different since it does not rely on logistic functions. The 
use of logistic functions in the present model allows for a more realistic representation that takes 
into account the processes of learning-by-doing and learning-by-installing, which play a key role in 
the diffusion of new technologies.5 It also allows us to derive patterns about the future trajectories 
of energy intensity and renewable energy that are similar with those of other related studies (see, 
for instance, Jones and Warner, 2016; Peters et al., 2017).  
 
2.2. Output determination and damages 
 
Eq. (3) shows our Leontief-type production function:  
 
 *N*K*E*M* Y,Y,Y,YminY   (3) 
 
where *Y  is the potential output. The potential output is the minimum of (i) the matter-
determined potential output ( *MY ) which depends on material reserves, (ii) the energy-determined 
potential output ( *EY ) which is a function of non-renewable energy reserves, (iii) the capital-
determined potential output ( *KY ) that relies on capital stock and capital productivity, and (iv) the 
labour-determined potential output ( *NY ) which depends on labour force and labour productivity. 
 
The actual output (Y ) is demand-determined. Aggregate demand is equal to consumption 
expenditures (C ) plus investment expenditures ( I ) plus government expenditures (G ):  
                                                 
5 For the importance of these processes in energy systems and renewable energy technologies, see e.g. Kahouli-
Brahmi (2009) and Tang and Popp (2016).  
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GICY   (4) 
 
However, demand is not independent of supply. When Y  approaches *Y , demand tends to 
decline due to supply-side constraints (this is achieved via our investment and consumption 
functions described below).  
 
Output determination is affected by climate change as follows: global warming causes damages to 
capital stock and capital productivity, decreasing *KY ; it also causes damages to labour force and 
labour productivity, reducing *NY .
6 These damages affect output in two ways. First, by 
experiencing or observing these damages, households and firms become more pessimistic about 
their future economic position. In particular, climate damages might increase the fears of 
entrepreneurs that their capital will be destroyed and that their profitability will be reduced. 
Moreover, natural disasters and health problems might induce households to save more for 
precautionary reasons.7 Therefore, consumption and investment demand are lower compared to 
what would be the case without damages. As a result, aggregate demand goes down when 
damages increase.8 Second, the climate-induced reduction in *KY  and 
*
NY  leads to a lower 
*Y . If 
aggregate demand is far below *Y , this second channel does not have a direct impact on output 
produced. However, when Y  becomes sufficiently close to *Y , investment and consumption 
decrease even more due to the climate damages, so as to be in line with the supply constraints. 
 
Eq. (5) is the damage function, which shows how atmospheric temperature ( ATT ) and damages are 
linked:  
 
7546
3
2
211
1
1
.
ATATAT
T
TTT
D
 
  (5) 
 
                                                 
6 For a discussion of these damages, see Appendix A and the references therein.  
7 For some empirical evidence about the impact of natural disasters on the saving behaviour of households, see 
Skidmore (2001). 
8 We assume that the expectations of households and firms about climate change damages are adaptive. Hence, their 
consumption and investment decisions are determined based on the damages of the previous year.   
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TD  is the proportional damage which lies between 0 (no damage) and 1 (complete catastrophe). 
Eq. (5) has been proposed by Weitzman (2012); 1 2 3, , 0    .
9 The variable TD  enters into the 
equations that determine capital stock, labour force, capital productivity and labour productivity, 
affecting thereby potential output. It also enters into the consumption and investment demand 
functions. Drawing on de Bruin et al. (2009), a distinction is made between gross damages and net 
damages. Gross damages are the initial climate changes without adaptation measures, while net 
damages are the damages after the implementation of adaptation measures.10 We assume that 
capital, labour and their productivities are affected by net damages. However, households and 
firms form expectations based on gross damages. We interpret Eq. (5) as a gross damage function.     
 
2.3. The financing of investment  
 
Firms’ investment is formalised as a two-stage process. At a first stage, firms decide their overall 
desired investment in both green and conventional capital ( DI ). At a second stage, they allocate 
their desired investment between the two types of capital. Eq. (6) captures the first stage:  
 
 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11
D
I TI u ,r ,ur ,ue ,um K K K D  
    
        
  
     
  
 (6) 
 
where K  is the capital stock and   is the depreciation rate. Net investment is affected by a 
number of factors. First, following the Kaleckian approach (see e.g. Blecker, 2002), it depends 
positively on the rate of (retained) profits ( r ) and the rate of capacity utilisation ( u ). The impact 
of these factors is assumed to be non-linear in general line with the tradition that draws on Kaldor 
(1940). This means that when the profit rate and capacity utilisation are very low or very high, 
their effects on investment become rather small.  
 
Second, following Skott and Zipperer (2012), we assume a non-linear impact of the 
unemployment rate (ur ) on investment: when unemployment approaches zero, there is a scarcity 
of labour that discourages entrepreneurs to invest. This employment effect captures Marx’s and 
Kalecki’s insights, according to which high employment strengthens the power of workers, having 
an adverse impact on the business climate. Theoretically, this negative effect of employment could 
be put into question in the presence of immigration and labour-augmenting investment. In the 
                                                 
9 Our damage function captures the aggregate effects of climate change. For a damage function that considers 
explicitly the heterogeneity of climate shocks across agents, see Lamperti et al. (2018).  
10 In our definition net damages do not include the financial cost of adaptation.   
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presence of immigration, entrepreneurs can expect that the flow of immigrants will relax the 
labour shortage constraint. Thus, investment might not decline when employment approaches the 
full employment level. However, this does not apply in our model, since we analyse the global 
economy and, thus, there is no immigration effect. Regarding labour-augmenting investment, it 
could be argued that when entrepreneurs observe an unemployment rate close to zero, they could 
relax the labour shortage constraint by increasing investment that enhances labour productivity. 
However, the adverse impact of climate change on labour productivity, that takes place in our 
model, makes it more difficult for the entrepreneurs to expect that more investment in labour-
augmenting technologies would relax the labour shortage constraint. Therefore, in the presence of 
climate change, it is less likely that firms will try to invest more in order to increase productivity 
and reduce the employment rate.11 
 
Third, the scarcity of energy and material resources can dampen investment, for example because 
of a rise in resource prices; ue  and um  capture the utilisation of energy and material resources 
respectively. This impact, however, is highly non-linear: energy and material scarcity affects 
investment only once the depletion of the resources has become very severe.  
 
Forth, in order to capture exogenous random factors that might affect desired investment, we 
have assumed that DI  also depends on a random component, I , that follows a stochastic AR(1) 
process. Overall, our investment function implies that demand declines (or stops increasing) when 
it approaches potential output. This allows us to take explicit into account the environmental 
supply-side effects on aggregate demand mentioned above. 
 
Eqs. (7) and (8) refer to the second stage of firms’ investment process: 
 
DD
G II   (7) 
D
G
DD
C III   (8) 
 
where   is the share of green investment ( DGI ) in overall desired investment (Eq. 7). Desired 
conventional investment ( DCI ) is determined as a residual (Eq. 8).  
 
The share of green investment is determined as follows: 
                                                 
11 Note, though, that our model takes into account the general role of labour-augmenting technologies by using the 
Kaldor-Verdoorn law in the determination of labour productivity. 
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    0 1 2 1 1 1 11L G C L G Csh int int sh yield yield                 (9) 
 
where Cint  is the interest rate on conventional loans, Gint  is the interest rate on green loans, 
Cyield  is the yield on conventional bonds, Gyield  is the yield on green bonds and Lsh  is the share 
of loans in the total liabilities of firms (loans plus bonds).  
 
Eq. (9) suggests that the share of green investment is affected by two factors. The first factor, 
captured by the term 10   , exogenous developments, such as the cost of installing and using 
green capital relative to conventional capital or institutional/policy changes that promote green 
investment (such as carbon pricing).12 The second factor, captured by the term 
     11112 1   CGLCGL yieldyieldshintintsh , reflects the borrowing cost of investing in green 
capital relative to conventional capital. As the cost of borrowing of green capital (via bank lending 
or bonds) declines compared to conventional capital, firms tend to increase green investment.  
 
As mentioned above, retained profits are not in general sufficient to cover the desired investment 
expenditures. This means that firms need external finance, which is obtained via bonds and bank 
loans. It is assumed that firms first issue bonds and then demand new loans from banks in order 
to cover the rest amount of their desired expenditures. Only a proportion of the demanded new 
loans is provided. In other words, the model assumes that there is a quantity rationing of credit. 
This is in line with recent empirical evidence that shows that the quantity rationing of credit is a 
more important driver of macroeconomic activity than the price rationing of credit (see Jakab and 
Kumhof, 2015).  
 
For simplicity, the bonds issued by firms are assumed to be one-year coupon bonds.13 Once they 
have been issued at their par value, their market price and yield are determined according to their 
demand. Firms set the coupon rate of bonds based on their yield in the previous year. This means 
that an increase in the market price of bonds compared to their par value causes a decline in their 
yield, allowing firms to issue new bonds with a lower coupon rate.   
 
The proportion of firms’ desired investment, which is funded via bonds, is given by: 
                                                 
12 Future extensions of the model could include an explicit effect of carbon pricing on the share of green investment. 
The model can also incorporate the direct effect of carbon taxes on the profits of firms and the taxes collected by the 
government.  
13 This assumption, which does not change the essence of the analysis, allows us to abstract from complications that 
would arise from having firms that accumulate bonds with different maturities.  
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1    (10) 
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2
1    (11) 
 
where Cb  is the number of conventional bonds, Gb  is the number of green bonds, 1x  is the 
proportion of firms’ conventional desired investment financed via bonds, 2x  is the proportion of 
firms’ green desired investment funded via bonds, Cp  is the par value of conventional bonds and 
Gp  is the par value of green bonds. 
 
The proportion of desired investment covered by green or conventional bonds is a negative 
function of the bond yield. Formally: 
 
111101  Cyieldxxx  (12) 
121202  Gyieldxxx  (13) 
 
where 10 11 20 21, , , 0x x x x  . 
 
We postulate a price-clearing mechanism in the bond market: 
 
C
C
C
b
B
p   (14) 
G
G
G
b
B
p   (15) 
 
where CB  and GB  denote the value of conventional and green bonds held by households and 
central banks and Cp  and Gp  is the market price of conventional and green bonds, respectively. 
Prices tend to increase whenever households and central banks hold a higher amount of corporate 
bonds in their portfolio. A rise in the price of bonds produces a decline in the bond yield, which 
has two effects on firms’ investment. First, since firms pay a lower coupon rate on bonds, their 
profitability improves increasing their desired investment. Second, a lower bond yield (which can 
result from a rise in bond prices) induces firms to increase the proportion of desired investment 
covered via bonds. This is crucial because firms need to rely less on bank lending in order to 
finance their investment. The disadvantage of bank lending is that, due to credit rationing, banks 
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provide only a proportion of the loans demanded by firms. Accordingly, the less firms rely on 
bank loans in order to finance their desired investment the higher their ability to undertake their 
desired investment. 
 
Based on firms’ budget constraint, the new loans demanded by firms are determined as follows:  
 
1 1
D D
G G G G G GNL I RP repL K p b         (16) 
  1 11
D D
C C C C C CNL I RP repL K p b          (17) 
 
where DGNL  denotes the desired new green loans, 
D
CNL  denotes the desired new conventional 
loans, GL  is the outstanding amount of green loans, CL  is the outstanding amount of 
conventional loans, RP  denotes the retained profits of firms and rep  is the loan repayment ratio.  
 
Firms might default on their loans. When this happens, a part of their accumulated loans is not 
repaid, deteriorating the financial position of banks. The amount of defaulted loans ( DL ) is equal 
to: 
 
1 defLDL  (18) 
 
where L  denotes the total loans of firms. 
 
The rate of default ( def ) is assumed to increase when firms become less liquid. The illiquidity of 
firms is captured by an illiquidity ratio, illiq , which expresses the cash outflows of firms relative to 
their cash inflows. Cash outflows include wages, interest, taxes, loan repayments and maintenance 
capital expenditures (which are equal to depreciation). Cash inflows comprise the revenues from 
sales and the funds obtained from bank loans and the issuance of bonds. The default rate is a 
non-linear positive function of illiq : 
 








1illiqfdef  (19) 
 
Eq. (19) suggests that, as cash outflows increase compared to cash inflows, the ability of firms to 
repay their debt declines. 
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2.4. The portfolio choice and consumption of households 
 
Households invest their lagged financial wealth ( 1HFV  ), which is a proxy for their expected one, in 
four different assets: government securities ( HSEC ), conventional corporate bonds ( CHB ), green 
corporate bonds ( GHB ) and deposits ( D ); Sint  is the interest rate on government securities and 
Dint  is the interest rate on deposits. In the portfolio choice, captured by Eqs. (20)-(23n), Godley’s 
(1999) imperfect asset substitutability framework is adopted.14  
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1 H H C CH G GHD D Y C SEC p b p b         (23) 
 
Households’ asset allocation is driven by three factors. The first factor is the global warming 
damages. We posit that damages affect households’ confidence and increase the precautionary 
demand for more liquid and less risky assets (see also Batten et al., 2016). Since damages destroy 
capital and the profitability opportunities of firms, we assume that as TD  increases, households 
reduce their holding of corporate conventional bonds and increase the proportion of their wealth 
held in deposits and government securities, which are considered safer.15 Second, asset allocation 
responds to alterations in the relative rates on return. The holding of each asset relies positively 
on its own rate of return and negatively on the other assets’ rate of return. Third, a rise in the 
transactions demand for money, as a result of higher expected income ( 1HY  ), induces households 
to substitute deposits for other assets.16 
 
                                                 
14 The parameters in the portfolio choice equations satisfy the horizontal, vertical and symmetry constraints.  
15 It could be argued that the demand for green corporate bonds is also affected negatively by the climate change 
damages that harm firms’ financial position. However, climate change damages might at the same time induce 
households to hold more green bonds in order to contribute to the restriction of global warming. Hence, the overall 
impact of damages on the demand of green bonds is ambiguous. For this reason, we assume that 030 '  in our 
simulations. Generally, it should be noted that the modelling of the effects of climate change on portfolio decisions is 
a very challenging task given the lack of suitable data. Our formulation should therefore be viewed only as a first 
attempt to model these damages. Further research on this topic is essential. 
16 Note that balance sheet restrictions require that Eq. (23n) must be replaced by Eq. (23) in the computer 
simulations. 
19 
 
Households’ consumption ( NC ), adjusted for global warming damages, depends on lagged income 
(which is a proxy for the expected one) and lagged financial wealth (Eq. 24). However, Eq. (24) 
holds only when there are no supply-side constraints; in that case, NC C . If the overall demand 
in the economy is higher than the supply-determined output, *Y , consumption adjusts such that 
the overall demand in the economy is below *Y ; note that pr  is slightly lower than 1. This is 
shown in Eq. (25).  
 
  1 1 2 1 11N H HF TC c Y c V D       (24) 
NC C  if 
*
NC I G Y   ; otherwise  *C pr Y G I    (25) 
 
2.5. Credit rationing and bank leverage 
 
As mentioned above, banks impose credit rationing on the loans demanded by firms: they supply 
only a proportion of demanded loans. Following the empirical evidence presented in Lown and 
Morgan (2006), the degree of credit rationing both on conventional loans ( CCR ) and green loans 
( GCR ) relies on the financial health of both firms and banks. In particular, credit rationing 
increases as the debt service ratio of firms ( dsr ) increases,17 as the bank leverage ( Blev ) increases 
relative to its maximum acceptable value ( maxBlev ) and as the capital adequacy ratio (CAR ) 
decreases compared to its minimum acceptable value ( minCAR ): 18 
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As in the case of investment, we assume that credit rationing is also dependent on a random 
component, CR , that follows a stochastic AR(1) process.  
 
The bank leverage ratio is defined as:  
 
                                                 
17 The debt service ratio is defined as the ratio of debt payment commitments (interest plus principal repayments) to 
profits before interest. Its key difference with the illiquidity ratio is that the latter takes into account the new flow of 
credit. 
18 In our simulations, the maximum bank leverage and the minimum capital adequacy ratio are determined based on 
the Basel III regulatory framework.  
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 B C G B Blev L L SEC HPM K     (28) 
 
where BSEC  is the government securities that banks hold, HPM  is high-powered money and BK  
is the capital of banks. 
 
The capital adequacy ratio of banks is equal to:  
 
 B L C G S BCAR K w L L w SEC      (29) 
 
where Lw  and Sw  are the risk weights on loans and securities respectively. 
 
We assume that when the bank leverage ratio becomes higher than its maximum value and/or the 
capital adequacy ratio falls below its minimum value, the government steps in and bailouts the 
banking sector in order to avoid a financial collapse. The bailout takes the form of a capital 
transfer. This means that it has a negative impact on the fiscal balance and the government 
acquires no financial assets as a result of its intervention (see Popoyan et al., 2017 for a similar 
assumption). The bailout funds are equal to the amount that is necessary for the banking sector to 
restore the capital needed in order to comply with the regulatory requirements. 
 
2.6. Central banks and green QE 
 
Central banks determine the base interest rate, provide liquidity to commercial banks (via 
advances) and buy government securities (acting as residual purchasers). Moreover, in the context 
of QE programmes, they buy bonds issued by the firm sector. Currently, central banks do not 
explicitly distinguish between the holdings of conventional and green bonds. However, in order to 
analyse the implications of a green QE programme, we assume that central banks announce 
separately the amount of conventional bond and green bond purchases. The value of 
conventional corporate bonds held be central banks ( CCBB ) is: 
 
1 CCCCB BsB   (30) 
 
where Cs  is the share of total outstanding conventional bonds that central banks desire to keep 
on their balance sheet. Currently, this share is very low since the corporate bond purchases of 
central banks represent a very small proportion of the total bond market. 
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The central banks’ holdings of corporate green bonds ( GCBB ) are given by: 
 
1 GGGCB BsB   (31) 
 
where Gs  is the share of total outstanding green bonds that central banks desire to keep on their 
balance sheet. We assume that this share is currently equal to zero since central banks do not 
implement green QE programmes.  
 
The implementation of a green QE programme should not be viewed as a simple extension of the 
current corporate sector purchase programme of central banks. The current corporate QE 
programmes have as an aim to improve credit conditions in order to help central banks achieve 
their inflation targets and they are meant to be of temporary nature. On the contrary, a green QE 
would be a kind of industrial policy with a much longer-term commitment. Hence, the decision of 
central banks to conduct such a programme would require a re-consideration of their mandate or 
a different interpretation of their role in ensuring financial stability in economies that might face 
increasing climate-related financial risks. This is especially the case for the central banks of high-
income countries, which have narrower mandates and a more strictly defined role in comparison 
with the central banks of low-income countries (see Campiglio et al., 2018).    
 
3. Calibration, estimation and validation of the model  
 
We have calibrated and estimated the DEFINE 1.0 model employing global data. Parameter 
values (a) have been econometrically estimated using panel data, (b) have been directly calibrated 
using related data, previous studies or reasonable values, or (c) have been indirectly calibrated 
such that the model matches the initial values obtained from the data or generates the baseline 
scenario. The related details are reported in Appendix A.19 
 
The model is simulated for the period 2016-2120.20 The aim of the simulations is to illuminate the 
long-run trends in the interactions between the financial system and climate change. Hence, no 
explicit attention is paid to short-run fluctuations and business cycles. In our simulations we focus 
                                                 
19 The majority of our calibrations rely on data that refer to the global economy and the global ecosystem. For the 
econometric estimations (that have been made for our investment, consumption and labour productivity functions), 
we have used panel data for a large set of countries which, however, does not cover the whole global economy. In the 
econometric estimations the parameters have the expected sign and are statistically significant. 
20 The R code used for the simulations is available upon request. 
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on two specific sources of uncertainty:21 (i) the uncertainty about the values of key parameters that 
capture the link between damages and the financial system; (ii) the uncertainty that stems from the 
stochastic AR(1) processes included in the investment and credit rationing functions. In order to 
deal with the first source of uncertainty, we conduct a sensitivity analysis described in Section 4. 
In order to tackle the second source of uncertainty, we perform 200 Monte Carlo simulations and 
we report the across-run averages.  
 
Our baseline scenario represents a ‘business as usual’ pathway whereby the global economy 
continues to expand in broad line with recent trends, and ecological efficiency improves 
moderately due to the continuation of technological changes and the implementation of some 
policies that promote green investment.22 Some key features of our baseline scenario are shown in 
Table 5. It is assumed that the economy grows on average at a rate slightly lower than 2.7% till 
2050; in other words, we postulate an economic expansion a little bit lower than the one observed 
over the last two decades or so.23 The unemployment rate remains, on average, close to 6% till 
2050. Drawing on the United Nations (2017) population projections (medium fertility variant), the 
population is assumed to grow at a declining rate, becoming equal to around 9.77bn people in 
2050. Moreover, the default rate on corporate loans is assumed to remain, on average, close to its 
current level, which is slightly higher than 4%. 
 
Table 5: Key features of the baseline scenario 
Variable Value/trend
Economic growth till 2050 slightly lower than 2.7% (on average)
Unemployment rate till 2050 slightly lower than 6% (on average)
Population in 2050 9.77bn
Labour force-to-population ratio in 2050 0.45
Default rate till 2050 slightly higher than 4% (on average)
CO2 intensity in 2050 as a ratio of CO2 intensity in 2016 around 0.9
Share of renewable energy in total energy in 2050 around 25%
Material intensity in 2050 as a ratio of material intensity in 2016 around 0.9
Energy intensity in 2050 as a ratio of energy intensity in 2016 around 0.7
Recycling rate in 2050 as a ratio of recycling rate in 2016 around 1.4
Annual green investment in the period 2016-2040 around US$1.1tn
Energy use in 2040 as a ratio of energy use in 2016 around 1.4
Yield of conventional bonds quite stable till around 2050
Yield of green bonds declines slightly in the next decade or so  
 
                                                 
21 A thorough investigation of all key sources of uncertainty is beyond the purpose of this paper.  
22 Carbon pricing is implicitly considered to be one of these policies.  
23 Based on data from World Bank.  
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CO2 intensity (which captures the industrial emissions per unit of fossil-fuel energy) declines by 
10% till 2050, for example due to the continuation in the replacement of coal with gas and the use 
of carbon capture and storage technologies.24 The share of renewable energy increases to about 
25% till 2050 (from about 14% which is the current level), while energy intensity is assumed to 
become approximately 30% lower in 2050 compared to its 2016 level. Material intensity and 
recycling rate also improve. The overall improvement in ecological efficiency indicators is 
associated with the accumulation of green capital. In our baseline scenario the annual green 
investment during the period 2016-2040 is equal to around US$1.1tn.25 The annual use of energy 
is 40% higher in 2040 compared to 2016.26     
 
We also assume that the yield on the conventional bond market remains relatively stable till 2050, 
while the yield of green bonds improves in the next decade or so. The latter is a result of an 
increasing demand for green bonds that outstrips their supply, in line with recent trends (see, for 
example, Climate Bonds Initiative, 2017).  
 
We do not expect that the structure of the time series data in the next decades will necessarily be 
the same with the structure of past time series. However, it is a useful exercise to compare the 
auto- and cross-correlation structure of our simulated data with the observed one in order to 
check whether the model produces data with reasonable time-series properties.27 This is done in 
Fig. 1. Figs. 1a-1d show the auto-correlation structure of the cyclical component of the simulated 
and observed time series for output, consumption, investment and employment up to 20 lags. 
Figs. 1e-1h show the correlation between the cyclical component of output at time t and of 
output, investment, consumption and employment at time t-lag. The series are expressed in logs 
and the Hodrick-Prescott filter has been used to isolate the cyclical component. The simulated 
data refer to the baseline scenario and capture only the period 2016-2080 in order to avoid the 
significant disturbances to the data structures that are caused by climate change after 2080 or so, 
when climate-induced bailouts start taking place. 
 
                                                 
24 For the importance of these factors in the determination of CO2 intensity, see e.g. Peters et al. (2017). 
25 Note that IEA (2016, p. 82) estimates that the annual investment in renewables and energy efficiency that is 
necessary over the period 2016-2040 in order to avoid a global warming higher that 2oC is close to US$2tn. Recall 
that green investment in our model does not only include investment in renewables and energy efficiency: it also 
includes investment that improves material intensity and the recycling rate. 
26 In the Current Policies Scenario presented in IEA (2016) the energy use in 2040 is 43% higher compared to 2016.  
27 For similar validation exercises see Assenza et al. (2015) and Caiani et al. (2016).  
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Fig. 1: Auto-correlations and cross-correlations of observed and simulated data 
 
(a) Auto-correlation: output 
 
(c) Auto-correlation: consumption 
 
(e) Cross-correlation: output 
 
(g) Cross-correlation: consumption 
 
 
(b) Auto-correlation: investment 
 
(d) Auto-correlation: employment 
 
(f) Cross-correlation: investment 
 
(h) Cross-correlation: employment 
 
 
Note: The series are expressed in logs and the Hodrick-Prescott filter has been used to isolate the cyclical component. For the simulated data, the across-run 
average autocorrelations and cross-correlations have been reported. The data for the observed variables have been taken from World Bank and refer to the 
global economy. Real output is available for the period 1960-2016, real consumption and real investment are available for the period 1970-2016 and 
employment is available for the period 1991-2016. 
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The auto-correlation structure of our simulated data is similar to the auto-correlation structure of 
the observed data. Moreover, simulated investment, consumption and employment appear to be 
pro-cyclical, in tune with the empirical data, and their overall cross-correlation with output 
resembles the cross-correlation observed in the real data. These results suggest that our model 
generates data with empirically reasonable properties.    
 
4. Climate change and financial stability 
 
Let us first summarise the key effects of climate change on economic variables in our model. 
Climate damages reduce (i) consumption and investment demand, (ii) households’ demand for 
conventional corporate bonds (increasing at the same time the demand for deposits and 
government securities), (iii) the labour-determined potential output (which is affected by labour 
productivity and labour force) and (iv) the capital-determined potential output (which is affected 
by capital stock and capital productivity). (i) and (ii) are affected by gross damages; in our baseline 
scenario we assume that the gross damages are 50% when CT o6 . On the other hand, (iii) and 
(iv) are affected by net damages, which in our baseline scenario are a relatively small proportion of 
gross damages. Climate damages also have a direct impact on the profitability of firms (since 
profits are affected by economic growth and the climate-induced depreciation of capital) and the 
rate of capacity utilisation (since the growth rate of output is not necessarily the same with the 
growth rate of capital-determined output). Both variables affect the desired investment of firms. 
Moreover, climate change influences the rate of employment since the growth rate of output is 
not necessarily the same with the labour-determined potential output.28 
 
All these economic effects affect the stability of the financial system with feedback effects on the 
environment. Fig. 2 summarises the main channels through which climate change and financial 
stability interact. Fig. 3 plots the simulation results. In the baseline scenario CO2 emissions 
increase significantly over the next decades (Fig. 3c). This rise is mainly driven by the exponential 
increase in output due to positive economic growth (Fig. 3a), the slow improvement in energy 
efficiciency and the low share of renewable energy in total energy (Fig 3b). Hence, CO2 
                                                 
28 Note that capacity utilisation is given by *KY Y , where 
*
KY  is the capital-determined potential output (equal to 
capital productivity times capital stock) and employment rate is given by *
NY Y  where 
*
NY  is the labour-determined 
potential output (equal to labour productivity times labour force).  
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concentration in the atmosphere increases, leading to severe global warming: as Fig. 3d indicates, 
in 2100 temperature becomes about 4oC higher than pre-industrial levels.29  
 
Fig. 2: Key channels through which climate change and financial stability interact in the model 
 
 
The rise in atmospheric temperature leads to climate change damages. Accordingly, the growth 
rate of output starts declining (Fig. 3a). This slowdown of economic activity becomes more 
intense after 2060 when temperature passes 2.5oC.30 Declining economic growth and the 
destruction of capital harms the profitability of firms (Fig. 3e) and deteriorates their liquidity, 
which in turn increases their rate of default (Fig. 3f) and thereby increases the bank leverage ratio 
(Fig. 3g) and decreases the capital adequacy ratio.31 The overall result is an increase in credit 
rationing, which feeds back into economic growth (Fig. 3a) and the profitability and liquidity of 
                                                 
29 This increase in temperature in our baseline scenario is broadly in line with the results of key IAMs (see Nordhaus, 
2016). Note that the parameter values that we have used for the carbon cycle and temperature equations rely on the 
recent updates of the DICE (Dynamic Integrated Climate-Economy) model by Nordhaus (2016). These updates 
produce more pessimistic results about the path of atmospheric temperature in the next decades. See also Bovari et al. 
(2018). 
30 Note that in 2100 the level of output in our baseline scenario is about 30% lower compared to a scenario in which 
there are no damages and economic growth continues to be close to its current level. 
31 The impact of climate damages on bank leverage is in line with the empirical evidence reported in Klomp (2014), 
which shows that natural disasters deteriorate the financial robustness of banks. Note that in our model the losses of 
firms due to the climate-induced destruction of their capital stock are not covered by the government or insurance 
companies.   
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firms, giving rise to a vicious financial cycle. This also slows down the investment in green capital, 
disrupting the transition to a low-carbon and more ecologically efficient economy. Crucially, at 
some point in time the capital of banks becomes insufficient to cover the regulatory requirements. 
Thus, the government sector steps in and bailouts the banks with adverse effects on the public 
debt-to-output ratio (Fig. 3h). Note that the exponential increase in the public debt-to-output 
ratio is also explained by (i) the reduction in tax revenues as a result of lower economic activity 
and (ii) the fact that the increase in public indebtedness causes a cumulative increase in interest 
payments that increases debt even further.   
 
Furthermore, climate damages affect the liquidity preference of households. The destruction of 
capital and the decline in the profitability of firms induces a reallocation of household financial 
wealth from corporate bonds towards deposits and government securities, which are deemed 
much safer. This is shown in Fig. 3i. The result is a decline in the price of conventional bonds, 
which leads to a substantial increase in their yield in the last decades of our simulation period (Fig. 
3j). This is an example of a climate-induced asset price deflation. Note that the exponential 
increase in the yield of bonds in the baseline scenario primarily stems from the convexity of 
damages: as global warming becomes more severe, the damages rise at an increasing rate.  
 
The yield of green corporate bonds also increases in our baseline scenario, after the decline in the 
first years (Fig. 3k). However, the main reason behind this increase is not the decline in the 
demand for green bonds by households. This increase is primarily explained by the increase in the 
supply of green bonds since desired green investment continuously increases in our simulation 
period (Fig. 3l).  
 
Bond price deflation has negative effects on economic growth because it reduces both the wealth-
related consumption and the ability of firms to rely on the bond market in order to fund their 
desired investment. It also leads to less green investment, which affects adversely the 
improvement in ecological efficiency. 
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Fig. 3: Evolution of environmental, macroeconomic and financial variables, baseline scenario and sensitivity analysis 
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(continued from the previous page) 
(e) Firms’ rate of profit 
 
(g) Banks’ leverage ratio 
 
 
 
(f) Default rate on firms’ loans 
 
(h) Public debt-to-output ratio 
 
 
 30 
 
(continued from the previous page) 
(i) Share of conventional corporate bonds in households’ wealth 
 
(k) Yield on green corporate bonds 
 
 
 
(j) Yield on conventional corporate bonds 
 
(l) Share of desired green investment in total investment 
 
 
Note: The baseline scenario reports across-run averages from 200 Monte Carlo simulations. The values used in this scenario are reported in Appendix A. The sensitivity range relies on the 8 cases shown in Table 6. For each case, we run 200 Monte Carlo 
simulations and we keep the across-run averages. The sensitivity range is derived based on the annual minimum and maximum values of the averages among the 8 cases.  
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How does the baseline scenario change when key parameters are modified? Space limitations do 
not allow us to explore this question in detail. However, we conduct a sensitivity analysis that 
concentrates on the key parameters that are related to the responsiveness of the financial system 
to climate damages. These include (i) the sensitivity of the default rate to the illiquidity ratio 
( 2def ), (ii) the sensitivity of credit rationing to the debt service ratio of firms, bank leverage and 
capital adequacy ratio ( 2 3 4 2 3 4l ,l ,l ,r ,r ,r ) and (iii) the parameters of the portfolio choice that capture 
the sensitivity of the liquidity preference of households to the global warming damages 
( 10 20 40
' ' ', ,   ). In the sensitivity analysis, these parameters increase or decrease by 50% compared to 
their baseline values. As shown in Table 6, we consider 8 cases which capture different 
combinations in the percentage change of parameters (i), (ii) and (iii). For each case, we run 200 
Monte Carlo simulations and we keep the across-run averages. The sensitivity range shown in Fig. 
3 is derived based on the annual minimum and maximum values of the averages among the 8 
cases.   
 
The sensitivity analysis illustrates that the evolution of the default rate, the bank leverage ratio and 
the yield of conventional corporate bonds is affected by the changes in the parameter values (see 
Fig. 3f, Fig. 3g and Fig 3j). In particular, it turns out that the default rate increases (decreases) 
more quickly when its sensitivity to the illiquidity ratio is higher (lower) compared to the baseline. 
The same holds for the bank leverage ratio. In addition, the yield of conventional corporate bonds 
declines more rapidly when the portfolio choice of households is more responsive to climate 
change damages. However, despite the fact that the parameter values affect the severity and the 
time horizon of the climate-induced financial instability, the effects of climate change on financial 
stability are qualitatively similar.32   
 
                                                 
32  Note that if we allow our simulations to continue after 2120 the share of renewable energy becomes at some point 
in time very close to 1, which leads to almost zero industrial CO2 emissions. However, because of the inertia of the 
climate system, atmospheric temperature continues to increase for many decades. 
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Table 6: Values of parameters modified in the sensitivity analysis 
Parameter Value in the 
baseline 
scenario
Case 
I
Case 
II
Case 
III
Case 
IV
Case 
V
Case 
VI
Case 
VII
Case 
VIII
Parameter of the default rate function (related to the 
sensitivity of the default rate to the illiquidity ratio of 
firms) (def 2 )
7.81 +50% -50% +50% -50% +50% -50% +50% -50%
Parameter of the function of credit rationing on green 
loans (related to the sensitivity of credit rationing to the 
default rate) (l 2 )
2.08 +50% -50% -50% +50% +50% -50% -50% +50%
Parameter of the function of credit rationing on green 
loans (related to the sensitivity of credit rationing to the 
leverage ratio of banks) (l 3 )
0.04 +50% -50% -50% +50% +50% -50% -50% +50%
Parameter of the function of credit rationing on green 
loans (related to the sensitivity of credit rationing to the 
capital adequacy ratio of banks) (l 4 )
2.08 +50% -50% -50% +50% +50% -50% -50% +50%
Parameter of the function of credit rationing on 
conventional loans (related to the sensitivity of credit 
rationing to the default rate) (r 2 )
2.08 +50% -50% -50% +50% +50% -50% -50% +50%
Parameter of the function of credit rationing on 
conventional loans (related to the sensitivity of credit 
rationing to the leverage ratio of banks) (r 3 )
0.04 +50% -50% -50% +50% +50% -50% -50% +50%
Parameter of the function of credit rationing on 
conventional loans (related to the sensitivity of credit 
rationing to the capital adequacy ratio of banks) (r 4 )
2.08 +50% -50% -50% +50% +50% -50% -50% +50%
Parameter of households' portfolio choice (λ 10 ' ) 0.10 +50% -50% -50% +50% -50% +50% +50% -50%
Parameter of households' portfolio choice (λ 20 ' ) -0.20 +50% -50% -50% +50% -50% +50% +50% -50%
Parameter of households' portfolio choice (λ 40 ' ) 0.10 +50% -50% -50% +50% -50% +50% +50% -50%
Percentage change (%) compared to the 
baseline scenario
 
 
 
5. Effects of a green QE programme 
 
In this section we analyse how our results change when a green QE programme is implemented. 
We suppose that in 2020 central banks around the globe decide that they will purchase 25% of the 
total amount of green bonds and they commit themselves that they will keep the same share of 
the green bond market over the next decades. We also assume that the proportion of 
conventional corporate bonds held by central banks remains equal to its current level.33 
 
                                                 
33 We find that the effects of a green QE programme do not differ significantly if we assume that central banks stop 
holding conventional corporate bonds.  
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Experimentation with various parameter values has shown that the parameter that plays a key role 
in determining the effectiveness of a green QE programme is the sensitivity of the share of 
desired green investment to the divergence between the green bond yield and the conventional 
bond yield ( 2 ) – see Eq. (9). The higher the value of 2  the more firms’ green investment 
responds to a monetary policy-induced decline in the yield of green bonds. Consequently, in our 
simulations we consider a green QE baseline scenario whereby 2  is equal to its baseline value 
but also some green QE scenarios in which 2  is allowed to take a number of values below and 
above its baseline value. 
 
The effects of the green QE programme are portrayed in Fig. 4.34 The green QE sensitivity range 
captures how the effects of a green QE programme are modified when 2  changes. As Fig. 4k 
shows, green QE boosts the price of green corporate bonds, reducing their yield. This has various 
positive implications for climate change and financial stability. Regarding climate change, let us 
first focus on the difference between the baseline scenario and the green QE baseline scenario. 
The reduction in the green bond yield leads to a lower cost of borrowing for firms and a lower 
reliance on bank lending. This increases overall investment, including green investment. More 
importantly, since the yield of green bonds declines relative to the yield of conventional bonds 
(Figs. 4j and 4k), the share of desired green investment in total investment goes up (Fig. 4l). As 
firms invest more in green capital, the use of renewable energy increases (Fig. 4b) and energy 
efficiency improves. This leads to lower CO2 emissions and slower global warming than what 
would otherwise be the case.  
 
                                                 
34 Note that different values of 2  would produce a different baseline scenario. Hence, the baseline scenario in which 
2 1   is not directly comparable with the scenarios reflected in the green QE sensitivity range since in these 
scenarios 2  is different from 1. 
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Fig. 4: Effects of the implementation of a green QE programme 
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(continued from the previous page) 
(e) Firms’ rate of profit 
 
(g) Banks’ leverage ratio 
 
 
 
(f) Default rate on firms’ loans 
 
(h) Public debt-to-output ratio 
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(continued from the previous page) 
(i) Share of conventional corporate bonds in households’ wealth 
 
(k) Yield on green corporate bonds 
 
 
 
(j) Yield on conventional corporate bonds 
 
(l) Share of desired green investment in total investment 
 
Note: The baseline scenario reports across-run averages from 200 Monte Carlo simulations. The values used in this scenario are reported in the Appendix A. In Green QE (baseline) the implementation of a green QE programme (captured by an increase in 
Gs  from 0 to 0.25) starts in 
2020 and the sensitivity of the desired green investment to the divergence between the green bond yield and the conventional bond yield (
2 ) is equal to 1, as in the baseline scenario. The sensitivity range for the green QE scenario is derived based on a range of values for 2  between 0.5 and 
4. For each of these values, we run 200 Monte Carlo simulations and we keep the across-run averages. The sensitivity range is derived based on the annual minimum and maximum values of the averages among the different values of 
2 . 
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It should, however, be pointed out that in our simulations green QE cannot by itself prevent a 
substantial rise in atmospheric temperature: as the green QE sensitivity range shows, even with 
more optimistic values of 2 , global warming is not significantly lower than 4
oC at the end of the 
century. There are two key reasons for that. First, the interest rate is just one of the factors that 
affect green investment. Therefore, a decline in the green bond yield is not sufficient to bring 
about a substantial rise in green investment. Second, a higher 2  is conducive to lower damages, 
allowing economic activity to expand more rapidly (Fig. 4a). This higher economic activity places 
upward pressures on CO2 emissions (Fig. 4c).  
 
Regarding financial stability, green QE increases firm profitability and reduces the liquidity 
problems of firms. This makes the default rate and bank leverage in the green QE baseline 
scenario lower compared to the baseline in which there is no green QE (Figs. 4f and 4g); it also 
reduces the public debt-to-output ratio (Fig. 4h). These beneficial effects on financial stability 
stem from (i) the reduction in economic damages as a result of slower global warming and (ii) the 
lower reliance of firms’ green investment on bank lending. A higher value of 2  reinforces 
generally the financial stability effects of green QE.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The fundamental changes that are expected to take place in the climate system in the next decades 
are likely to have severe implications for the stability of the financial system. The purpose of this 
article was to analyse these implications by using a stock-flow-fund ecological macroeconomic 
model. Emphasis was placed on the effects of climate change damages on the financial position 
of firms and asset price deflation. The model was estimated and calibrated using global data and 
simulations were conducted for the period 2016-2120.   
 
Our simulation analysis for the interactions between climate change and financial stability 
produced three key results. First, by destroying the capital of firms and reducing their profitability 
and liquidity, climate change is likely to increase the rate of default of corporate loans that could 
harm the stability of the banking system. Second, the damages caused by climate change can lead 
to a portfolio reallocation that can cause a gradual decline in the price of corporate bonds. Third, 
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climate-induced financial instability might adversely affect credit expansion, exacerbating the 
negative impact of climate change on economic activity. The sensitivity analysis illustrated that 
these results do not change qualitatively when key parameter values related to the financial system 
are modified.  
 
The article also investigated how a green corporate QE programme could reduce the risks 
imposed on the financial system by climate change. The QE that has been examined in the paper 
is of a very different nature compared to the current QE programmes: it has a long-run horizon 
and it is a kind of industrial policy rather than a cyclical tool. The simulation results showed that, 
by increasing the price of green corporate bonds, the implementation of such a green QE 
programme can reduce climate-induced financial instability and restrict global warming. However, 
as expected, green QE is not by itself capable of preventing a substantial reduction in atmospheric 
temperature. Even with an optimistic assumption about the sensitivity of green investment to the 
divergence between the green bond yield and the conventional bond yield, global warming is still 
severe. Hence, many other types of environmental policies need to be implemented in 
conjunction with a green QE programme in order to keep atmospheric temperature close to 2 oC 
and prevent climate-induced financial instability. These could include traditional green fiscal 
policies (such as carbon taxes and green public investment), other green finance policies apart 
from QE (such as green loans subsidies and green differentiated capital requirements) and 
regulatory interventions that would induce more environmentally friendly consumption norms 
and methods of production. The investigation of the economic, financial and environmental 
implications of such policies is left for future research. 
 
Appendix A: Supplementary material 
 
The technical description of DEFINE 1.0 (May 2018) and the information about the data used 
for the calibration and estimation of the model can be found at: www.define-model.org. 
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